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Abstract
This paper considers labour supply and demand shocks in a simple flow model of the labour
market. We explicitly model the propagation of shocks and the adjustment mechanisms. By
way of simulations we explore the extent of labour market hysteresis arising from negative
duration dependence and the so-called entitlement effect that arises when social security
provisions become more generous. The main findings of our modelling exercise are: (i) the
extent of hysteresis depends very much on the way labour  demand reacts to labour supply, (ii)
negative duration dependence adds to unemployment hysteresis, and, (iii) the degree of
hysteresis depends on the type of the shock.
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1. Introduction
During the 1970s and 1980s the Netherlands, like most other European countries, witnessed a
dramatic rise in the unemployment rate (see Figure 1 below). This rise was characterised  by a
number of upward jumps; steady state unemployment seemed to move to a higher level after
each cyclical downturn (see e.g. Bean (1994)). This pattern in unemployment rates suggests
that there is unemployment persistence in the Netherlands (see e.g. Hartog and Theeuwes
(1993),  Graafland (1988)).
Figure 1 Unemployment in the Netherlands (x 1000 persons)
600 -
500 -
400 -
300 -
ol,,.,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,..,,,,,,,,,,
70 75 8 0 8 5 90 9 5
Source: CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
Due to shocks to labour  supply and demand unemployment may deviate from its unique long-
run balanced growth level. Several factors may prevent a quick return to its long-run balanced
growth level, e.g. adjustment costs, wage-price stagger& 0 effects, insider-outsider effects,
hazardous welfare state dynamics and a loss of skills in unemployment (see e.g. Bean (1994),
Lindbeck (1995),  Snower (1997)). In this paper we focus on negative duration dependence
and on the entitlement effect of social security as possible causes of unemployment
persistence.
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A loss of skills in unemployment which reduces the stock of human capital in the labour
market may cause negative duration dependence in the exit rate out of unemployment. A loss
of skills in unemployment may hamper the process by which unemployed job seekers are
matched to vacant jobs (see e.g. Layard et al. (1991) Pissarides (1992),  Ljunqvist and Sargent
(1998)). On the demand side, firms may close down part of their vacancies if the fall in the
stock of human capital is unaccompanied by an equiproportionate fall in wage and search
costs per unit of human capital. On the supply side, a loss of skills may reduce the search
effort over the unemployment spell. The returns from job search may fall due to a reduced
ability to locate vacant job slots or via a downward shift in the relevant wage offer
distribution. More in general, negative duration dependence may also arise because of
discouragement, getting accustomed to live on unemployment benefits and shifting moral
standards which even lead some of the unemployed to seek employment in the underground
economy (see e.g. Lindbeck (1995)).
These latter causes of negative duration dependence are related to the “entitlement effect of
social security”. In the seventies the social security system in The Netherlands became
increasingly generous. As a result more persons from the working age population learned
to become eligible for social security provisions. Estimation of the entitlement effect
residual trend in social security provisions which can not be explained by demand (see
h o w
as a
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Butter (1993)) shows that it may have led to
provisions of about 300 000 labour  years.
contributions may lower the utility derived
unemployment.
an autonomous increase in social security
The resultin g increase in social security
in the state of employment relative to
In this paper we consider how the “entitlement effect” and negative duration dependence
affect a stylized model of the Dutch labour market. Specifically, we consider the persistence
of unemployment deviations from its long-run balanced growth level in a simple flow model
of the labour  market. On the demand side of the model we have firms that post vacancies. On
the supply side we have short- and long-term unemployed job-searchers and a stock of non-
participants that actively search for a job. The speed at which demand and supply come
together is determined by an aggregate matching function. The number of job-worker
separations is fixed.
The paper has the following outline. Section 2 presents the flow model. Section 3 considers
the impact of labour  supply shocks on unemployment. Section 4 considers the impact of
labour  demand shocks on unemployment. Section 5 concludes.
2. The model
Individuals in the working age population can be in one of four states on the labour  market:
employment, E, short-term unemployment, Us, long-term unemployment, Ul, and non-
participation, N. Jobs in the labour market can be either filled and producing, E, or vacant and
searching, V.
The distribution of workers and jobs over the different states depends on the flows between
them. In this paper we focus on worker flows. Specifically, we consider the endogenous
determination of the flow from unemployment to employment, the flow from non-
participation to employment and the flow from short- to long-term unemployment. All other
flows are exogenous in the model.
The core of the model is a constant-returns-to-scale Cobb-Douglas matching function. This
specification is typically not rejected in empirical work on the Dutch labour  market (see e.g.
Broersma and Van Ours (1998)). The matching function can be viewed as a neo-classical
production function that relates the number of matches (output), M,  to the number of effective
job-seekers and vacancies (inputs). The effective number of job seekers is a weighted sum of
the number of short- and long-term unemployed, and non-participants. The aggregate number
of matches is given by
iv  = cv”  (U,  +  eu,  + PN)‘-~,
where c and a denote search technology parameters. We multiply the long-term unemployed
by a factor 0 (0 c 8 < 1). 8 reflects negative duration dependence in the escape rate from
unemployment due to a loss of skills or other reasons for negative duration dependence at the
micro level mentioned in the introduction. Furthermore, we weigh the number of non-
participants by p (p > 0), p reflects a differing effective input of non-participants in the
aggregate matching process (search intensity, acceptance probability) relative to the short-term
unemployed.
The outflow rates into employment from short-term unemployment, x*~,  long-term
unemployment, z*i, and from non-participation, x~,  are given by
7T; =M,lU,= Ml(U,+8U,  +pN),
*
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and
respectively. The overall escape rates from unemployment for short- and long-term
unemployed are given by
7th. = 7(* + uo,  I (us  + eu,  j,
and
where UO,  denotes the exogenous outflow from unemployment, that is, individuals flowing
from unemployment to non-participation and individuals flowing from unemnlovment  to
employment without filling a vacancy (i.e. unemployed individuals filling a latent vacancy).
The model is specified in monthly periods. Short-term unemployment at
the sum of the first 12 duration classes of unemployment at time t
time t is defined as
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The first duration class in short-term unemployment is assumed to be equal to the inflow into
unemployment, UZ. The number of individuals in the subsequent duration classes k in short-
term unemployment at time t are given by
Long-term unemployment at time t is given by
u
1 t
,
= (1- n, )u,, t-1
,
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The model explicitly describes the flows through the various duration classes of
unemployment and hence the propagation of shocks through time (see Den Butter and Van
Dijk (1998) for a related model). This feature of the model is essential for calculating
unemployment persistence during the period that unemployment deviates from its equilibrium
value after a shock.
Having discussed the endogenous flows in our model of the labour  market we complete the
model by considering the relation between the stocks and flows. Unemployment evolves
according to the law of motion
where UI  denotes the inflow in unemployment, UO  denotes the outflow from unemployment,
FeU  is the exogenous flow from employment to unemployment associated with job destruction,
Fnu is the exogenous inflow from non-participation into unemployment, Fuev  is the number of
matches for the unemployed, Fuej is the exogenous number of unemployed that fill a latent
vacancy and Fun  is the exogenous outflow from unemployment to non-participation.
Employment evolves according to the law of motion
Et  = E t - 1  + E1t  - EO, = Et-1  +  ( Fuev t , + Fuej t, + Fnev t9 + Fnej t > - CFeu t9 , + Fen t I*,
EZ denotes the inflow into employment, EO denotes the outflow from employment, Fnev
denotes the endogenous number of non-participants that fills a vacancy, Fnej denotes the
exogenous number of non-participants that fills a latent vacancy and Fen  denotes the
exogenous outflow from employment to non-participation. In the base projection of the model
we assume that the inflow of vacancies and non-participants equals the respective outflow
from these states.
In the base projection of the model we use the average flows observed in the Dutch labour
market over the period 1970-1995.  For the construction of these data see Kock  (1998)’ The
efficiency parameter c is calibrated so as to let the average outflow from unemployment and
non-participation accord with the data. Furthermore, the weights of vacancies and
unemployment in the aggregate matching function, a and (l-a>,  are set in accordance with the
findings of Broersma and Van Ours (1998) on Dutch data.
3. Labour supply shocks
In this section we consider how unemployment evolves after a shock to labour  supply, under
various assumptions. We present two sets of simulations. In the first set of simulations
(Section 3.1) we assume that labour demand reacts so as to keep the ratio between vacancies
and the effective number of job-seekers unchanged (in line with search theory, see e.g.
Pissarides (1990, Chapter 3)). In the second set of simulations (Section 3.2) we assume that
the number of job slots is fixed (‘lump-of-labour-fallacy’). Specifically, we assume that
inflow of vacancies is independent of the number of effective job-seekers.
The shock to labour  supply is modelled  as a temporary change in Fnu  or pN by 7.5 thousand
persons in the first 12 months of the simulation. When the labour  supply shock is modelled  as
a change in Fnu unmatched additional labour  supply joins the unemployment pool. When the
labour  supply shock is modelled  as a change in pN  unmatched additional labour  supply
remains in the state of non-participation.
’ Part of the flows are data. The unknown flows are constructed under the assumption that over the period
1970-1995 inflow into the various states was equal  to the outf low over the period considered.
3.1 Flexible number of job slots
In this set of simulations we assume that the number of vacancies in the market is given by
Vt =V* +&Ust  +8u,, +pN,  -U,* +BU; +pN*),9 7
where V* , Us*,  6&*  and phN*  denote the number of vacancies, short-term unemployed, the
effective number of long-term unemployed and the effective number of non-participants
searching for a job in the steady-state equilibrium, respectively. 5 denotes a positive
parameter. In line with the model of Pissarides (1990, Chapter 3) we assume that the ratio of
vacanices over the number of effective job-seekers remains unchanged after a labour supply
shock <5 is set at the ratio between vacancies and the effective supply of labour  in the steady-
state). In response to a positive (negative) shock to labour  supply vacancies jump above
(below) their steady-state level.
Simulation results of a positive and a negative shock to the inflow from non-participation into
unemployment are given in Table 1 below.
Table 1 Effect on unemployment of a change in F,,, VI flexible
I Specification 1 Effect on unemployment as a percentage of the shock after I
Positive shock
0=1
8 = 0.5
Negative shock
8=1
8 = 0.5
1 year
73.2
84.2
-73.2
-84.2
3 years 1 0 years
21.9 03  . 0
4 3 . 9 4 5  . 0
-21.9 -0 . 3 0
-43.9 -4 . 5 0
In the first specification we assume no duration dependence in the escape rate from
unemployment (8 = 1 (see Section 2)). In the second specification we assume that there is
(negative) duration dependence (0 = 0.5).
The first thing to note from Table 1 is that unemployment changes in response to the increased
inflow. Indeed. even though vacancies rise (decline) in nronortion  with the increase (decrease)I
in the number of
u
effective job
The matching
\ / A A
seekers, unemployment stays above its
quite some time.
period.
technology accommodates only part of
equilibrium level for
the shock in a given
Second, the initial impact of a shock on unemployment is larger when there is duration
dependence in the exit rate from unemployment. The increased (decreased) inflow pushes
unemployment above (below) its equilibrium level. Consequently, the share of long-term
unemployed individuals increases (decreases), reducing the effective supply of labour  at given
unemployment. This hampers the ability of the matching process to equilibrate the market.
Whereas the shock has virtually vanished after 10 years when there is no duration dependence,
still 5 per cent of the shock is in the system after 10 years when there is duration dependence
in the exit rate.
Finally, we observe that the impact of a positive and negative shock to the inflow into
unemployment on unemployment is symmetric.
We do not report simulation results on shocks to pN  on unemployment. Indeed, as vacancies
adjust so as to keep the ratio between vacancies and the effective number of unemployed
unchanged the outflow rates from short- and long-term unemployed are unchanged. As neither
the in- nor the outflow from unemployment changes when there is a change in the effective
number of non-participants looking for a job, the impact on unemployment is nil when
vacancies are fully flexible.
3.2 The second set of simulations
In the second set of simulations we assume that the change in labour  supply does not induce a
response in labour  demand. Specifically, we assume that the number of job slots (vacant and
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filled jobs) remains unaltered when labour  supply changes (‘lump-of-labour-fallacy’). We
model this as a fixed inflow in the number of vacancies which is set equal to the exogenous
outflow from employment (i.e. a world with a fixed number of job slots).
We present four simulations. In the first two simulations we shock the inflow from non-
participation into unemployment, Fnu. Simulation results are reported in Table 2.
Table 2 Effect on unemployment of a change in Fnu, VI fixed
I Specification Effect on unemployment as a percentage of the shock after I
\ I
1 year 3 years 1 0 years
Positive shock
e= 1 87.1 65.1 27.6 0
8 = 0 . 5 85.3 6 8 . 4 35.1 0
Negative shock
e= 1 -84.9 -57.7 -21.9 0
e= 0.5 -82.7 -61.5 -28.6 0
In Table 2 we present simulation results on positive and negative shocks to the flow from non-
participation into unemployment. We assume that unmatched non-participants join the pool of
unemployed. The simulation with a positive shock may represent the entitlement effect where
the increase in labour  supply does not alter the costs of opening a vacancy and therefore does
not affect labour  demand.
Once again we note that unemployment changes in response to the change in the inflow into
unemployment. However, when the number of job slots is assumed to be fixed, shocks are far
more persistent. Furthermore, unemployment persistence depends positively on the extent of
(negative) duration dependence. Finally, note that the impact of shocks is (more) asymmetric
when vacancies are fixed (which reflects the decreasing marginal ‘output’ from additional job-
seekers in the matching function).
1 0
In the third and fourth simulation we shock the number of non-participants that offer their
labour, where unmatched non-participants do not flow into unemployment but remain in the
state of non-participation. Simulation results are given in Table 3 below.
Table 3 Effect on unemployment of a change in pN, VI fixed
Specification Effect on unemployment as a percentage of the shock after
1 year 3 years 1 0 years
Positive shock
e = 1 25  . 24  . 10 . 0
.
e = 0.5 30  . 31 . 15 . 0
Negative shock
e = i -2 . 6 -2 . 5 -1 . 0 0
e = 0.5 -3 .  1 -3 . 2 -1 . 6 0
Changes in the number of non-participants that offer their labour  do affect unemployment
when the stock of job slots, vacancies plus employment, is fixed (note: the effect was nil when
vacancies were fully flexible). Indeed, an unchanged stock of jobs has to be divided among
more candidates. Unemployment eventually returns to its equilibrium level. After the shock
the number of matches is above its equilibrium level as long as the inputs (unemployment) in
the matching function are above their equilibrium level, pushing unemployment down. Note
that with duration dependence the impact on unemployment is larger after 3 years than after 1
year, whereas the effect eventually falls to zero. The unemployed temporarily face more (less)
competition from non-participants, whereas the inflow of vacancies is fixed. After the shock
has ended, the stock of vacancies will be below (above) its equilibrium level, pushing
unemployment further away from its equilibrium level. However, there is a steady inflow of
new vacancies. Hence, the stock of vacancies eventually recovers after the initial shock, and
so does the outflow from unemployment (in our model there is only one equilibrium level of
unemployment).
Furthermore, note that impact of either shock on unemployment is limited when unmatched
non-participants do not join the unemployment pool. Hence, if a labour  supply shock is to
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have a large effect on unemployment, the additional labour  supply has to be counted as
unemployed. Finally, note that the impact of positive and negative shocks on unemployment is
virtually identical.
From the supply shock simulations we conclude that the impact of labour  supply shocks
depends negatively on the flexibility of labour  demand, and positively on the degree of
unemployment persistence. The impact on unemployment is most pronounced when the
unabsorbed change in labour  supply joins the unemployment pool.
4. Labour  demand shocks
In this section we briefly consider the relation between competition between unemployed and
non-participants and labour  demand shocks. We implement labour  demand shocks as a
temporary change in the stock of vacancies in the market. Specifically, the number of
vacancies decreases (increases) by 50 per cent during the first year of the simulation. We
consider the impact of changes in the number of vacancies on unemployment in the presence
and absence of competition from non-participants.
Simulation results in the absence and presence of competing non-participants are given in
Tables 4 and 5 below, respectively.
Table 4 Effect on unemployment of a change in V, p = 0
Specification Effect on unemployment as a percentage of the shock after
1 year 3 years 1 0 years
Positive shock
8=1 -7 . 6 -4 .  1 -0 . 5 0
e= 0.5 -8 . 3 -5 . 9 -19 . 0
Negative shock
e= 1 10.6 59  . 0 7  . 0
e= 0.5 11.2 81 . 2 6  . 0
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Table 5 Effect on unemployment of a change in V, p > 0
Specification I ~~~~
Effect on unemployment as a percentage of the shock after
1 year 3 years 1 0 years
Positive shock
e= i -7 . 2 -3 . 3 -0 . 2 0
e= 0.5 -8 .  1 -5 . 3 -1  . 3 0
Negative shock
e= i 10.3 49  . 0 4  . 0
e= 0.5 I 11.0 I 74  . I 18 . I 0 I
From Table 4 and 5 we observe that the presence of competing non-participants reduces the
responsiveness of unemployment to shocks to labour  demand, i.e. changes in vacancies.
Positive shocks to labour  demand are partly absorbed by non-participants, reducing the
number of additional job slots available for unemployed job seekers. Negative shocks to
labour  demand are partly absorbed by non-participants, once again softening the impact on
unemployment.
Furthermore, we observe that the impact of demand shocks on unemployment is asymmetric.
Positive shocks reduce unemployment by more than negative shocks raise it (due to the
diminishing returns to the inputs in the aggregate matching function).
5. Concluding remarks
In this paper we consider labour  supply and demand shocks in a simple reduced-form flow
model of the labour  market. The model simulations aim at investigating the extent of labour
market hysteresis which can be ascribed to negative duration dependence and to the social
security system becoming more generous so that changes occur in the pattern of competition
between the various groups who are searching for a job.
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The main findings of our modelling exercise are:
1. When the shock to labour  supply is modelled  as a change in the inflow from non-
participation into unemployment, unemployment is pushed above its equilibrium level.
2 . The impact on unemployment is larger when the exit rate from unemployment is subject to
negative duration dependence. Hence negative duration dependence contributes to the
hysteresis of unemployment after a labour  supply shock
The impact on unemployment is larger if the number of vacancies does not respond to the
change in the supply of labour.
When we model the shock of labour  supply as a change in the number of non-participants,
i.e. they are not registered as unemployed and therefore do not flow into unemployment,
the effect on unemployment is limited. Indeed, when the ratio between vacancies and the
effective supply of labour  does not change in response to the shock, the effect on
unemployment is zero.
Competition from non-participants in search for jobs softens the impact of shocks upon
unemployment.
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